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INTRODUCTION
Off and on for decades inquiry has been promoted as a means for engaging science students in
scientific activity that promotes deep conceptual learning and develops students' scientific
literacy.  Most recently, national standards call for students to engage in inquiry as a means of
learning what the scientific enterprise is all about (NRC, 1996).  For the most part, although
there has been a fair amount of research to document students' beliefs about the nature of science
(Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989; Carey & Smith, 1993; Lederman, 1992; Linn &
Songer, 1993), relatively little attention has been paid to how we can support changes in students'
scientific epistemologies (cf. Smith, Maclin, Houghton, & Hennessey, 1999).  On theoretical
grounds, the argument for engaging students in inquiry centers on the idea that the "final form
science" (Duschl, 1990) of typical instruction develops a belief about science and scientific
practice that is at odds with current philosophies of science (Hodson, 1988).  There is also some
evidence that students who see science as a dynamic enterprise of theory development are better
able to integrate formal scientific conceptions with their everyday experience (Songer & Linn,
1991).
Knowledge representations can be instructional tools that focus students’ conceptual and
epistemological thinking in particular ways. For science education it is especially important that
students learn to develop models and explanations of natural phenomena (Coleman, 1998;
Coleman, Brown, & Rivkin, 1997), as well as learn how scientific theories and arguments relate
to real-world phenomena (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Kuhn, 1993). Currently, various
software tools support students’ construction of models (Jackson, Stratford, Krajcik, & Soloway,
1994), explanations (Sandoval & Reiser, 1997), and arguments (Linn, Bell, & Hsi, 1998;
Suthers, Toth, & Weiner, 1997) for natural phenomena. We are concerned with exploring how to
support students' inquiry to foster an epistemological approach towards science learning as
“science in the making” rather than as “ready made science” (Latour, 1987). Different
knowledge representations can support students in important aspects of their inquiry including
knowledge articulation, testing, communication, and refinement. Structured representations
support students’ participation in particular “epistemic games” (Collins & Ferguson, 1993):
organized practices for representing and using forms of knowledge. We envision such
knowledge representations as including models, argument maps, explanations, diagrams,
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simulations, and data (e.g., graphs, tables).  Such knowledge representations can be coordinated
and used to support productive collaboration between students for conceptual or epistemic
change (Linn et al., 1998; Sandoval, 1998; Suthers, 1999; Vahey, Enyedy, & Gifford, in press).
This paper presents initial findings from our collaborative effort to understand the roles various
kinds of scientific representations play in supporting students' epistemological learning in
science, through their development of epistemic practices. We present concrete design principles
for the development of representational tools that support students’ inquiry and their
development of scientific epistemic practices; and we sketch a framework for using such tools to
support students’ collaborative inquiry, both face-to-face and online.  These principles elucidate
what we have learned about the ways in which representational tools support students’
articulation of their knowledge, evaluation and negotiation of those ideas with their peers,
collaboration around the knowledge representations, and instructional practices that support such
complex forms of inquiry.  We first present a general overview of our meaning of epistemic
practices and general design principles to promote them.  Subsequent sections briefly describe
how our various research efforts instantiate these design principles within knowledge
representations and activities designed to guide students' use of these representations.
EPISTEMIC PRACTICES IN SCIENCE
We draw a distinction here between epistemic understanding and epistemic practice.  Epistemic
understanding refers to the set of ideas that we would like students to understand and be able to
appropriate as they engage in or think about science.  Epistemic practices are the cognitive and
discursive activities that we want students to engage in to develop their epistemic understanding.
To support particular practices, we have developed design principles for knowledge
representations and activities in which such representations are used.  Table 1 provides a general
outline of the epistemic understanding we want students to develop, the epistemic practices that
develop and in an important sense constitute that understanding, and design principles we have
used to support these epistemic practices.  The rest of this section describes these goals for
epistemic understanding and the epistemic practices.  Subsequent sections illustrate how our
various design projects articulate the general design principles in Table 1.
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Table 1:
Epistemic understanding goals, epistemic practices, and design principles for supporting them.
Goals for epistemic understanding
Seeing knowledge as an object of inquiry
Understanding various forms of scientific knowledge
Understanding criteria for evaluation of knowledge claims
Understanding the reciprocal nature of theory and data
Understanding representations within interpretive frameworks
Epistemic practices
Explicit articulation and evaluation of one's knowledge
Coordinate theory and evidence
Make sense of patterns of data
Develop representational fluency
Hold claims accountable to evidence and criteria
Design principles
Provide epistemic forms for students' expression of their thinking
Give distinct forms of knowledge distinct representations
Design representations that can be coordinated and linked
Representations should prompt and support epistemic (not just conceptual) practices
Communicate evaluation criteria and connect them to representations
Goals for epistemic understanding
Students' beliefs about the nature of science have been well studied, and generally students see
science as the discovery of facts about the world rather than a process of constructing theories to
try to explain the world (Carey et al., 1989; Driver et al., 1996; Lederman, 1992; Linn & Songer,
1993).  We suggest that there are (at least) five major goals for students' epistemic
understanding, and that if students can develop this understanding they will more effectively
engage in self-directed inquiry, and develop deeper conceptual understanding of specific
disciplines grounded within epistemological frameworks.
Knowledge as an object of inquiry
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the origins, nature, methods, and limits
of human knowledge.  Clearly, to develop a personal epistemology about science students must
be able to consider knowledge, their own and others, as an object of inquiry, or as D. Kuhn
(1993) put it, an "object of cognition."  Students' must be able to explicitly reflect upon what
they know, how they know it, and why they believe it.  Furthermore, students should develop
views of science that recognize that scientific knowledge is socially constructed, including
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theoretical ideas, methods for investigation questions, and the criteria by which knowledge
claims are evaluated.
Understanding forms of scientific knowledge
Scientific knowledge is represented in many different forms that differ in explanatory or
predictive power, and that carry certain epistemological commitments.  Moreover, various forms
of knowledge are used to represent and explain different kinds of things.  Theories, for example,
offer broad explanatory (and sometimes predictive) power, and generate explanations for
particular events.  Models are usually explicit representations, often mathematical, of phenomena
that are constructed from within theoretical perspectives.  Scientific models attempt to generally
attempt to characterize important relations among theoretical entities, but verisimilitude is not a
requirement (e.g., chemists do not suggest that molecules are really balls connected by sticks, but
ball-and-stick models convey important relationships about molecules).  Within any given
discipline, students need to understand the various forms of knowledge that are valued, and what
are the agreed-upon uses for various kinds of knowledge and the methods for generating and
evaluating new knowledge.
Criteria for evaluation
For students to become active participants in the construction of scientific knowledge, even just
for themselves, they need to know the criteria by which scientific knowledge is evaluated.  Such
criteria include plausible causal mechanisms, parsimony, consistency with observed data, and
consistency with current theories.  New theories often are held to a criterion that they contain
more explanatory power than existing theories (T. Kuhn, 1970).
The reciprocal nature of theory and data
Expert scientists and philosophers of science recognize that theoretical views influence
interpretations of data, and even judgments about what counts as data within a discipline.
Conversely, new data can sometimes lead to radical shifts in theoretical perspectives.  Theory
and data are thus reciprocally related, and it is an over-simplification to think of scientific
activity as either theory-driven or data-driven.
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Understanding representations within interpretive frameworks
Representations do not in and of themselves entail complete interpretive frameworks.  Rather,
models, diagrams, formulas, and other knowledge representations reflect choices about what is
deemed assumed, and therefore implicit, and what must be explicitly represented.  To use and
create scientific representations successfully requires an understanding of the interpretive
frameworks in which representations exist.
Epistemic practices
The above goals lead to a set of practices for generating and evaluating knowledge, a set of
practices that we can meaningfully engage students in during science instruction.  We suggest
that the following practices, while not the only valuable epistemic practices we might want
students to learn, are key practices for developing the epistemological understanding just
described.
Explicit articulation and evaluation of one's knowledge
Given that we want students to see knowledge as an object of inquiry and to understand different
forms of scientific knowledge, then their science learning should be centered around creating and
evaluating knowledge.  The argument for knowledge articulation and evaluation is common in
current theories of learning.  We want to emphasize that this practice is useful for more than
deepening students' understanding of science concepts, but is crucial to students' development of
sophisticated epistemological conceptions about science.
Coordinating theory and evidence
The central aim of science is to construct theories that explain natural phenomena.  This effort
requires the coordination of theoretical ideas with the data that provide evidence of their utility
as explanations. A key aspect to the practice of coordinating theory and evidence is to be able to
distinguish claims from evidence.  The practice of coordinating theory and evidence entails using
theories to explain data, and using data to evaluate theories.  This could be done a number of
ways, as demonstrated by the approaches described in the following sections of this paper.
Making sense of patterns of data
An important aspect of theory building is the development of explanatory frameworks that make
sense of disparate sources of data, by imposing patterns on them.  Scientists often speaking of
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seeing patterns in the data, but the patterns that we see are constrained by our own theoretical
frameworks.  For students, the desired practice of making sense of patterns of data includes the
explicit consideration of multiple sources of data.  Also, in combination with the practice of
coordinating theory and evidence, looking at the same data from alternative perspectives is an
important way to make sense of them.
Develop representational fluency
We view representational fluency as being able to interpret and construct various disciplinary
representations, and to be able to move between representations appropriately.  This includes
knowing what particular representations are able to illustrate or explain, and to be able to use
representations as justifications for other claims.  This also includes an ability to link multiple
representations in meaningful ways.
Hold claims accountable
Understanding the criteria to which scientific claims are held, and the essentially social nature of
science, requires that students' own knowledge claims be accountable to these criteria.  We view
discourse as a central means to realizing this practice in classrooms.  Science classrooms should
be organized as knowledge building communities (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1993) in which
discussion and debates about claims and evidence are central activities.  Students should be
encouraged to justify their claims, and causal claims should be challenged with respect to
available data and consistency with other theories and knowledge.
Design principles for epistemic representations
Our collaborative analysis of our various efforts to support students' inquiry into science and
mathematics has identified two broad kinds of representations that support epistemic practices.
One type of representation are explicitly epistemic representations, especially structures for
students' representation of arguments.  Such representations are designed to reify epistemological
commitments and directly support epistemic practices.  It may or may not be the case that such
representations correspond to representations or inscriptions common to scientific practice.  The
second type of representation includes discipline-specific models, such as molecular models in
chemistry or the representation of outcome spaces in probability.  Such representations are
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common to expert practice in the discipline, and as such their epistemic features are often
implicit.
The following sections describe our approaches to designing such representations, with an
emphasis on the particular design principles each representation instantiates, and the epistemic
practices each representation supports.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to present detailed
empirical findings about how these representations function in various learning settings.  Where
possible, we have included references to more detailed explication of our several studies.
EXPLANATIONCONSTRUCTOR: REPRESENTATIONS AND ACTIVITIES FOR
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
William A. Sandoval, University of California, Los Angeles
ExplanationConstructor is a software tool designed to support students' explanation of problems
of natural selection and evolution, as part of technology-infused curricula developed as part of
the BGuILE project (Reiser et al., to appear).  Following research showing that when students
understand the purpose of experimentation as the discovery of causal relationships they are better
able to design and conduct experiments (e.g., Dunbar, 1993; Schauble, Glaser, Duschl, Schulze,
& John, 1995), a basic premise of our approach has been to focus students' inquiry in terms of
the products that inquiry should produce.  Our focus has been on students' development of
causal, evidence-based explanations.  Our general approach is described in detail in Reiser, et al.
The discussion here is confined to a description of the design principles used to develop
representations in ExplanationConstructor of important epistemic entities students work with
during inquiry.  This section briefly highlights how we have explored a set of trade-offs among
how various knowledge representations support or hinder students' epistemic practices, and how
other materials and activity can support students' interaction with these representations.  This
section summarizes the design history of ExplanationConstructor, and how classroom studies of
its use have led to its development.  The primary point we wish to make here is that knowledge
representations such as those discussed in this paper, and others, support certain aspects of
students' reasoning about the nature of scientific knowledge, as they create it, but that in
themselves such representations are insufficient to push students to explicitly consider their own
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epistemological commitments or the implicit epistemological commitments underlying scientific
inquiry.
Grounding epistemic forms in specific domains
ExplanationConstructor was specifically developed to structure students' efforts to construct
scientific explanations. The issue was to figure out what kind of epistemic forms would scaffold
students' learning to play the "scientific explanation game."  There were two epistemological
standards for scientific explanations that we wanted students to be able to satisfy: 1) the
articulation of clear, coherent causal explanations for natural phenomena that 2) were supported
by appropriate evidence.  Our guiding design principle was that an epistemic form that
represented these two criteria should be grounded within the domain of students' inquiry, in this
case the domain of evolution and natural selection.  Another principle was that students'
explanations be tied to their efforts to answer specific questions, and that explanations be
represented distinctly from the data used as evidence to support them (see SenseMaker and
Belvedere, below).
Link explanations to specific questions
The first version of ExplanationConstructor, illustrated in Figure 1, has been described in detail
elsewhere (Sandoval, 1998; Sandoval & Reiser, 1997).  In relation to our goals for students
epistemological understanding, it was important to communicate not only what scientific
explanations are like, but what they are for.  Our stance was (and is) that explanations answer
specific questions, so explanations should be linked to specific student questions.  In
ExplanationConstructor, students first recorded a question they were trying to answer, then later
created one or more candidate explanations for it (see Sandoval, 1998 for details about the
BGuILE curricula and how students worked through specific investigations).  Linking questions
and explanations seems to have helped students monitor their progress in terms of what they felt
they needed to know, their questions, and what they felt they did know, their explanations.
Because these representations are distinct and persistent, students could return them over the
course of their extended investigations of problems of natural selection.  Moreover, group
monitoring was focused in epistemic terms, concerning the ability of explanations to answer
questions (Sandoval, 1998).
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Represent theories as explanatory frameworks
One feature that distinguishes ExplanationConstructor from other collaborative inquiry tools,
such as Belvedere, described below, or CSILE (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1993) is that it provides
domain-specific scaffolds through explanation guides (we have earlier called these explanation
templates, Sandoval & Reiser, 1997).  Explanation guides provide both conceptual and epistemic
scaffolds.  Conceptually, explanation guides focus students on the appropriate content of specific
explanations.  In Figure 1, for example, the "selective pressure" guide visually represents the
theory of natural selection into components that prompt students for the important constituents of
a natural selection explanation.
Epistemically, explanation guides encourage students' to think about theories as explanatory
frameworks, super-ordinate to explanations for specific events.  For each problem that students
investigate, there are multiple guides to choose from.  Because students have to choose
explanation guides for each explanation, they are encouraged to map their emerging
understanding into domain theory, to place themselves within a particular explanatory
framework.
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Figure 1:ExplanationConstructor 1.0.  Questions, explanations, and evidence are distinctly
represented, and explanations are highly structured (right).
Classroom studies of this first version of ExplanationConstructor showed that templates often
provided direct guidance for students about their progress and about what data they should look
for next (Sandoval, 1998).  That is, groups could see how much of an explanation they had
completed, and the specific prompts within guides suggested the kind of data that could help
them complete each component.  Of course, such guidance was available only prospectively,
when students created new explanations before looking at all the potentially relevant data.
Linking evidence to causal claims
Data are not in themselves particular epistemic forms, but they have quite a different
epistemological status from the causal claims derived from them.  This distinction, as noted
earlier, is often not made by students, but they seem to view explanations as being embodied in
data, not interpretations given to data.  ExplanationConstructor not only represents the data that
students use as evidence separately from their causal claims about that data (Figure 2).  Students
have to actually select specific pieces of data as evidence, and then link them to specific causal
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claims.  Thus, the theory-evidence distinction is made both in the representations students use
and in their manipulations of those representations.
This first version of ExplanationConstructor seemed to provide productive supports for epistemic
practices during students' small-group collaborative inquiry.  Students engaged in frequent
monitoring of their progress in explicitly epistemic terms, especially in evaluating the quality of
their explanations as answers to their questions and whether or not they were based on
appropriate data.  Students' investigations were also highly planful, consistently focused on
satisfying explanatory goals over the course of sustained, week-long investigations.  On the other
hand, the work-sheet like representation of the explanation guides sometimes worked against
students' articulation of coherent explanations.. Also, the facility for linking and later viewing
evidence was a bit opaque, consequently students rarely cited data for their explanations even
though it was clear that they had examined relevant data and were reasoning from it.
Material and activity supports for evaluation
These findings motivated revisions to the ExplanationConstructor tool and spurred us to design
other material supports that would encourage students to consider the quality of their
explanations more explicitly, such as whether or not they were coherent and how specific causal
claims explained specific data.
Clarifying connections between epistemic entities
A significant change to ExplanationConstructor was to make more clear the relationship between
the different epistemic entities represented within the tool, namely questions, explanations, and
evidence.  One change was to organize questions and explanations hierarchically, to make it
more clear that explanations answer particular questions.  The hierarchy also allows students to
explicitly record sub-questions subordinate to the over-arching questions of their investigations.
For example, as shown in Figure 2, when trying to answer how the bacteria that cause
tuberculosis can survive antibiotics, it might first be necessary to determine how antibiotics
attack cells as a step in identifying potential differences between bacterial strains.
Another change was to make students' selected evidence for their explanations much more
visible and salient (Figure 2).  We also changed the way students cited data to allow them to
insert a reference to data anywhere in their explanations and encouraged them to include them
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immediately after relevant causal claims.  We found in a subsequent classroom study that not
only did students cite more data in their explanations, but that they often explicitly discussed
why that data was important evidence (Sandoval, 1998).
Another change to the software was to move the explanation guides out of the space where
students wrote their explanations.  Thus, they were still available for guidance, but students
became more responsible for supplying connective causal language in their explanations.  in fact,
this is what seemed to happen.  We do not yet know, although analyses are underway, whether or
not these slightly removed explanation guides continued to productively direct students'
investigative activities as the previous version had.
Explanation evaluation as a social practice
As far as students' epistemic practices are concerned, probably the single most important revision
we made was to develop a specific rubric for students' evaluation of their explanations, and to
provide them with clear opportunities to apply the rubric.  This rubric highlights what we
consider to be four key epistemological criteria for scientific explanations: 1) that they articulate
a clear, coherent chain of cause and effect; 2) that they are supported by sufficient relevant
evidence; 3) that alternative explanations of data have been explicitly considered and ruled out;
and 4) that students articulate the limits of their own explanations, even those they consider their
best ones. This rubric, although designed by participating teachers and the research group,
becomes an object of discussion between students and teachers, and students take ownership of
the criteria through their evaluation of their own and their peers' work.
ExplanationConstructor has a review facility that students can use to assess themselves or their
peers.  These reviews are tied to specific explanations (Figure 2), and are given using the rubric.
Fundamentally, though, explanation evaluation is a social process, governed by the
socioscientific norms (Tabak, 1999) of specific classrooms.  An important goal of inquiry-based
science learning ought to be to help students appropriate those norms, and to understand the
epistemological commitments that underlie them.  Consequently, a central feature of BGuILE
curricula are mid-investigation peer reviews, and post-investigation consensus-building
discussions.  Mid-investigation reviews give students the chance to be reflective critics of each
other's work, while maintaining an opportunity to respond to specific criticisms.  They also give
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students repeated opportunities to apply the criteria of the explanation rubric. Post-investigation
class discussions publicly articulate students' findings and allow students' to evaluating
competing ideas to develop a consensus explanation for each problem. Throughout the unit,
these consensual discussions provide teachers with opportunities to tie specific investigative
experiences to broader domain principles.
Figure 2: ExplanationConstructor 2.0, showing the relations between questions, explanations,
and evidence.
We found that students' critiques of each other noted a lack of specificity, especially failures to
state causal mechanisms, as well as a lack of data as evidence.  Students' most common self-
assessments of their explanations at the end of an investigation were to acknowledge the limits of
their accounts.  Thus, the rubric and activities combined to encourage students to reflect on the
quality of their own and each others' explanations in epistemologically important ways, and in a
way that merely the construction of those explanations did not encourage.
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SENSEMAKER:  REPRESENTING ARGUMENT-EVIDENCE RELATIONS FOR
CONTROVERSY-FOCUSED SCIENCE EDUCATION PROJECTS
Philip Bell, University of Washington
SenseMaker is a knowledge representation software tool and instructional approach that reifies
and supports aspects of scientific argumentation for educational purposes (Bell, 1998; Bell &
Linn, in press). It uses argument maps as a representational scheme to highlight the coordination
of theory and evidence for the purpose making individual and group thinking visible.
SenseMaker has been used predominantly for classroom science projects where students are
exploring a controversial topic in science (Bell, 1998). More recently, we have been exploring
the use of SenseMaker as the knowledge representation component of on-line communities
focused on knowledge networking.1
Design Principles for Using a Knowledge Representation to Support Argumentation
In the rest of this section, I describe four design principles derived from research on the
instructional use of SenseMaker as part of the project-based approaches used in the KIE (Bell,
Davis, & Linn, 1995), SCOPE and WISE research efforts. The principles were identified and
refined through iterative cycles of design, enactment, and study (Brown, 1992; diSessa, 1991).
There is increasing empirical support for the notion that educational innovations—whether they
make use of technology or not—are systemic or package-like in their nature (Brown &
Campione, 1998; Salomon, 1996). For this reason, I have made connections between the
following subset of principles as I describe them. These principles, of course, also connect to
designed and emergent aspects of the educational package and setting that extend beyond the
scope of this section. For this reason, the four principles that follow should only be considered a
partial depiction of this particular effort. Specifically, the following four design principles focus
on the central use of SenseMaker argument maps as a knowledge representation scheme for
controversial topics.
Theory-Evidence Coordination. Left to their own accord, middle school students rarely
incorporate instances of evidence into their arguments about science. Argument
                                                
1 We are exploring this use of SenseMaker as part of the SCOPE project (see http://scope.educ.washington.edu/).
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representations should promote theory and evidence presence, distinction and
coordination.
This principle is motivated by the image of science represented in the epistemic goal that
students "understand the reciprocal relationship between theory and data." The epistemic game
of interest here focuses on a coordination of evidence—our version of data to be
interpreted—and theoretical claims associated with the topic of inquiry. Researchers have
documented how students do not come to science class understanding this type of argumentation
(Driver et al., 1996; Kuhn, 1991).
Based on this prior research, is it unreasonable to expect students to productively coordinate
evidence and theory?  That is, do students have an epistemological facility for engaging in such
evidence-theory coordination if they were to receive appropriate supports and enculturation?
Prior research on the use of SenseMaker has documented how students can regularly coordinate
evidence and theory when provided with appropriate supports (Bell, 1998; Bell & Linn, in
press). Both evidence and theoretical claims are components of the ontology associated with the
SenseMaker software—as dots and frames, respectively. Figure 3 shows a fragment of a
SenseMaker argument representation.
Figure 3: Student Argument Map in SenseMaker showing evidence dots and nested claim frames
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The active coordination of evidence and theory in the representation also supports the epistemic
goals of knowledge being the object of inquiry in science and the importance of understanding
the reciprocal relationship between theory and data.  This creation and tethering of evidence and
theory is the inquiry students are engaged in during our controversy-focused debate projects.
Through this particular depiction of scientific argumentation (which is an intermediate form to
be sure) students are being introduced to an important form of scientific knowledge—another of
our goals for epistemic understanding.
Evidence Collections. When students do attend to evidence in their argumentation, they
tend to fixate on individual pieces. Argument representations should promote students'
engagement with a collection of evidence.
Research has shown that students tend to predominantly focus on single instances of evidence
(when they attend to it at all) to inform their claims and arguments (see Driver et al., 1996 for
discussion). Elaborating upon the epistemic priority we've given to THEORY-EVIDENCE
COORDINATION, we have found that students benefit from being encouraged to consider a
collection of evidence as they engage in argumentation (Bell, 1998). By exploring an evidence
collection and being asked to represent and coordinate the set in the argument representation,
students are encouraged to not fixate on individual pieces. Making sense of an evidence
collection is a unique affordance of the SenseMaker representation. It supports the epistemic
practices associated with having students make sense of patterns of data as they coordinate
theory and evidence.
Shared Corpus of Evidence. Engaging classes of students with a common corpus of
evidence will allow the teacher to more quickly refine usable pedagogical content
knowledge and instructional strategies related to the topic. It will also help establish an
increased degree of common ground during classroom discussions.
As important as it is to represent a COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE in an argument representation, we
have found it useful for that collection to consist of a shared corpus for students to explore as
part of the curriculum project. An alternative would be to allow pairs of students to explore
different collections of evidence. It is likely that this alternative approach could be used to
promote the development of distributed expertise within the classroom (Brown & Campione,
1998). But, what are the possible benefits of using a shared evidence corpus for all students in a
class?
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First of all, a shared corpus allows the classroom teacher to develop pedagogical content
knowledge relevant to supporting students with their engagement with the evidence and thinking
about the project topic (Wilson, Shulman, & Richert, 1990). Predictably, each piece of evidence
cues prior knowledge somewhat systematically from the students. Pieces of evidence of different
forms also benefit from particular types of engagement with understanding that piece. For
example, an evidence item that depicts a specific laboratory experiment calls for an interpretation
of details from the experiment and the associated data generated.
Another important consequence associated with using a common corpus of evidence is that it
helps establish common ground in the discourse of these learning communities as they explore
the project topic (Edwards & Mercer, 1987). The corpus allows groups of students along with the
teacher to work toward a shared understanding of the same phenomena and theoretical ideas. In a
related manner, students will often invoke common life experiences as a form of evidence in
their verbal arguments in order to make their arguments more compelling and understandable.
For this very reason, we also have students extend the SHARED CORPUS OF EVIDENCE with
instances of this evidence from their own personal life experiences. It also allows students to
connect the project topic to their own lives and develop more an integrated understanding of the
topic.
Represent student thinking and topical perspectives. Promote the use of the argument
representation as a blended representational medium that depicts: (a) students thinking
and theorizing about the controversial topic (based on their prior and evolving
understanding), and (b) different perspectives associated with the controversy.
…further refining the principled focus on EVIDENCE-THEORY COORDINATION through  an
engagement with an EVIDENCE COLLECTION that is SHARED, we can now describe how
SenseMaker can serve as an inscriptional system for representing students' scientific ideas,
notions, conjectures on the one hand and various perspectives (perhaps hypotheses, positions,
solutions, or propositions) about the controversy topic associated with the project. Although both
dimensions of this knowledge come to be represented, they become interrelated (or blended) in
the actual representation. This is typically an interaction of how the representation was originally
designed by the project developer (or teacher), and how the students represent their
understanding and conjectures visibly in the representation.
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As the project begins in the classroom, the SenseMaker representation is set-up with some initial
theoretical structure built into it in the form of competing claim frames. In this regard, it is useful
to map out the competing perspectives associated with the controversy. For example, in a debate
project about whether or not DDT should be globally banned, positions that could be initially
presented to students as they commence working would include different policy positions about
banning DDT due to its severe impact on ecosystems and a position arguing for a moderated use
of DDT since prevents multitudes of deaths each year from malaria in almost two dozen
countries.  The DDT ban topic is predominantly a policy issue. With a topic that is more of a
strict scientific debate, the different perspectives initially represented might be the competing
hypotheses being explored.
Apart from looking to the topic for guidance in the initial design of the representation, it has also
been useful to represent positions that will resonate with students initial thinking about the
topic—in order to give them a way to easily represent their personal understanding in their
argument map. The blend of the student thinking within the perspectives associated with the
topic can promote active sense-making and perspective-taking on the part of students (see Bell,
1998 for details).
Will students spontaneously theorize about the evidence and about the topic? The short answer is
that it depends. If the topic is one associated with students' everyday experiences, they are more
likely engage with the topic in a naïve realist manner. That is, they will have a natural tendency
to be phenomenologically descriptive of evidence and take evidence as an unproblematic
depiction of theoretical perspectives (cf. Driver et al., 1996). As students COORDINATE  EVIDENCE
AND THEORY, other aspects of the SenseMaker approach can support students in theorizing about
evidence rather than being simply descriptive (for details see Bell, 1998; Bell & Linn, in press).
BELVEDERE: REPRESENTATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR REASONING ABOUT
EVIDENCE
Dan Suthers, University of Hawai'i at Manoa
From its conception, the Belvedere project has been concerned with the role of representations in
fostering epistemic practices in science (Cavalli-Sforza, Weiner, & Lesgold, 1994). The initial
goal was to provide a rich graphical notation for the full range scientific argumentation, along
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with a software coach that would help students express and refine their arguments. The original
notation represented various forms of scientific propositions (such as data generalizations,
hypotheses and theories) as nodes, and connected them with links representing various types of
relationships, including evidential/explanatory (supports, predicts, explains), argumentive
(warrants, undercuts), logical, causal, and temporal relations. We used graphical representations
in order to provide students with concrete forms for the abstract components and relationships of
theories and related arguments, and to enable both students and the automated coach to identify
ways in which further contributions can be made to the argument.
Subsequently the project emphasis shifted to collaborative learning rather than one-on-one
tutoring. Observations of pairs of students working with the argumentation representations
(Suthers & Weiner, 1995) indicated that the representations as we designed them were too
complex for students' initial encounters with this new and unfamiliar kind of activity. As a result
we simplified the representations to focus on two fundamental distinctions: the epistemological
distinction between empirical and theoretical propositions, and the evidential distinction between
consistency and inconsistency relations between these propositions. Subsequent work included
preparation of a classroom implementation methodology, along with "science challenge"
problems and peer-assessment rubrics (Suthers et al., 1997).
In this section I reinterpret Belvedere's representations in terms of the epistemic goals, epistemic
practices, and design principles described in the first section of this paper. In each example I will
work from goals to design principles that address these goals, and then indicate how application
of each given principle in Belvedere prompts students to engage in the desired practices. In a few
cases I will note deficiencies in Belvedere's design and potential improvements. I will then
consider the question of alternative representations, and describe ongoing work that seeks to
uncover ways in which these alternatives may differ in their prompting of epistemic practices.
Goal: Seeing knowledge as an object of inquiry
The most fundamental epistemological goal is that learners see knowledge as an object of
inquiry. Without this epistemological stance, the other goals discussed in this paper cannot be
achieved.
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Principle: Provide epistemic forms for students' expression of their thinking
The corresponding design principle is also fundamental: our software (and other educational
media and activities) should provide visible representations that make knowledge explicit as
objects to be constructed, manipulated, and evaluated through public negotiation. The other
design principles are simply refinements on how this reification of knowledge should be
accomplished.
Practice: active manipulation of representations of knowledge as object
Learners using Belvedere make the information that they are interpreting and the hypotheses that
they are formulating and evaluating visible as shapes in a graph, and make the structural aspects
of their evidential arguments visible as links (Figure 4). We hypothesize that the activity of
creating and linking knowledge representations guides learners to view their knowledge as open
to intentional manipulation, just as the representations are.
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Figure 4. Evidence map under construction.
For example, consider the following transcript from a study with college students investigating
possible causes of the disease ALS on Guam. The students have just generated three hypotheses
concerning possible contaminants in water sources (the water is used to remove toxins from
fadang, a food source). One student (L) proposes making an explicit record of their uncertainty,
to be resolved later, using three links of type "unspecified" (the "?" links in Figure 4). This
constitutes an example of use of the representations to reflect an explicit acknowledgement of the
status of their knowledge and their intention to refine that knowledge.
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L: There's so much difference with the water.
R: Rainwater, well water, stream water. <laughs>
L: Yeah! Maybe we can just put it so that we know, and maybe we can connect
that hypothesis saying that what they soaked it in was the rainwater, so therefore
the rainwater… you know? <Pointing from bottom left to top center of notes>
R: Oh, okay, it could be either or.
L: Yeah. So if it was stream water, we could connect it to there <Pointing to
center of screen> So we know that in the stream water, like…
R: So we connect these two right here? <Pointing with cursor from H3
"rainwater?" to D4 "soak fadang 2wks…"> No? Make another one?
L: Yeah.
R: So make another hypothesis, or make another…
L: Fadang, soaking water. <Typing H8: "fadang soaking water?">
R: Oh, that's the hypothesis?
L: Yeah. So later if we find out what kind it is, we can connect it. <Pointing to
center of notes> So that if it's stream water, then we'll know that inside the stream
water they used, there was this.
Goal: Understanding various forms of scientific knowledge
Given that one is treating knowledge as an object of inquiry, other considerations come into play.
Learners must first be able to discriminate different forms of knowledge before they can treat
these forms according to their different status. "Epistemology" is concerned with the origins of
knowledge. The most fundamental epistemological distinction to be appreciated by learners is
that between empirical observations -- knowledge that comes from the world -- and theoretical
claims -- knowledge that comes from our attempts to make sense of the world. Empirical
observations have a primacy that theoretical claims ones do not; while theoretical claims have
explanatory power that empirical ones do not. Hence we wish to design representations that
scaffold awareness of these distinctions.
Principle: Give distinct forms of knowledge distinct representations
The consequent design principle, that distinct forms of knowledge should be given distinct
representations, is adhered to in Belvedere by the use of different shapes (and the corresponding
toolbar commands that create them) to represent "data" versus "hypotheses." Similarly, different
kinds of links (and commands) represent "for" versus "against."
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Practice: Learners practice identifying and speaking in terms of the forms.
If we have succeeded in our design, learners will be prompted by their use of the software to
practice speaking in terms of these distinctions. This prompting is what we tried to accomplish
when we focused Belvedere's representations on the two fundamental epistemological and
evidential distinctions discussed previously, deferring for the time being elaboration into other
nuances of scientific argumentation. The following dialogue excerpt (from one of our early
middle-school studies) illustrates how the requirement, imposed by the software, that one make a
choice along the epistemological dimensions of empirical versus theoretical can lead to peer
coaching on the meaning of this distinction. (The software used the terms requested by the
classroom teacher: "data" and "claim".)
S1: So data, right? This would be data.
S2: I think so.
S1: Or a claim. I don’t know if it would be claim or data.
S2: Claim. They have no real hard evidence. Go ahead, claim. I mean who cares?
who cares what they say? Claim.
Goal: Understanding the reciprocal nature of theory and data
The hallmark of a good theory is that theoretical claims are consistent with known empirical
observations while also predicting interesting new ones. We wish to maximize the consistency
between theory and observations (including predicted as well as confirmed observations), while
minimizing inconsistencies. Theory and data are reciprocal in process as well as structure: good
data often lead inductively or serendipitously to new theories; and good theories predict new
observations to make.
Principle: Enable coordination and linking of representations of data and theory
Representations should prompt one to consider and seek out relationships between theory and
data. This is the primary point of Belvedere's graphical representation, in which learners
construct explicit links between different types of propositions. The graphical representations are
also intended to make it easy to see patterns of relationships, particularly patterns that might
prompt new constructive activity such as seeking further evidence bearing on a hypothesis that
seems weakly related to the data at hand, or finding data that discriminate between two
hypotheses that seem to explain the existing data equally well. These opportunities for
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constructive action are pointed out by a software advisor, which provides advice based on
patterns in the evidence graphs (Paolucci, Suthers, & Weiner, 1996; Suthers, Weiner, Connelly,
& Paolucci, 1995).
Practice: Learners see their task as actively relating theory and data
Empirical work with Belvedere provides ample evidence that Belvedere prompts learners to
consider evidential relationships between propositions. A recent pilot study quantified the effect.
Pairs of middle-school students worked on an open-ended science investigation. We measured
the percentage of on-task verbal utterances that addressed issues of evidential relationships. Talk
about evidence was an order of magnitude greater for two pairs of students using Belvedere
(5.2%, or 32 of 613 on-task utterances) than for two pairs using a text editor (0.5%, 4/694).
Belvedere's representational guidance of reasoning between data and theory could be improved.
The representations provide no guidance in considering the generation of new hypotheses from
data or making empirical predictions from theory. These activities require domain-specific
knowledge which Belvedere was not designed to capture.
Goal: Understanding criteria for evaluation of knowledge claims
Not all propositions are created equal. As propositions become part of the scientific knowledge-
building discourse, we need to evaluate them against criteria such as reliability and objectivity of
measurement instruments, coverage of the empirical observations by theories, and internal
consistency of theories.
Principle: Enable annotation of knowledge claims with evaluation criteria
Our representations should make the criteria for evaluation, and preferably their application to
knowledge claims, visible. This is a specialization of the principle of making knowledge building
visible.
Practice: Hold claims accountable to evidence and criteria
Belvedere's representations provide for evaluation in two ways. First, the visible configurations
of consistency and inconsistency links enable learners to quickly assess the relative support for
and against hypotheses, including their coverage and the presence of conflicting evidence.
Second, one can change the line thickness of all graphical knowledge representation objects to
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express the learners' confidence in them -- a feature not used much by students in our field
studies, perhaps because the manipulation by which one adjusts strength was available only via a
menu.
A limitation is that the criteria by which one makes evaluative judgements were not explicit in
the representations, although they were offered in textual form by the automated advisor. The
advisor highlights the knowledge objects of concern, states a general evaluative principle and
states its implications for action in the present case. Belvedere's representations might do more
work in guiding epistemic reasoning if the criteria themselves were made explicit, perhaps as
patterns which learners could visually match to their graphs.
Ongoing work
Implicit in the foregoing discussion -- and in much of the work in this field -- is the assumption
that we know how to design representations that make certain aspects of knowledge visible and
guide learners' thinking and acting. Design decisions are often made based on designer's
intuitions and informal work with users rather than being informed by explicit study of the
question. As a result it is not surprising that software tools with goals similar to those of
Belvedere (supporting epistemic practices among collaborative learners) utilize representations
as diverse as graphs (e.g., Belvedere), threaded discussion (e.g., Web-Camile and Web-SMILE,
Guzdial et al., 1997), linked notecards (e.g., Collaboratory Notebook, O'Neill & Gomez, 1994),
containers (e.g., SenseMaker, Bell, 1997), or some combination thereof (e.g., CSILE, Hewitt &
Scardamalia, 1996). There are both empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that the
expressive constraints imposed by a representation and the information (or lack of information)
that a representation makes salient may have important effects on students’ discourse during
collaborative learning (Suthers, 1999). However, to date no systematic study has been
undertaken to explore possible effects of this variable on collaborative learning. I am currently
conducting such a study, comparing three representational tools for recording evidential
relationships: unconstrained text (control condition), Belvedere-style graphs, and matrix
representations. The study is comparing both process measures (e.g., talk about evidence) and
outcome measures (e.g., memory for problem facts and quality of argumentation in a written
essay). The matrix representations are expected to lead to the most exhaustive consideration of
evidential relations, perhaps at the cost of not focusing on the most important ones.
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It is not the intent that alternate representations be viewed as mutually exclusive. In fact, we are
currently implementing a new release of Belvedere that will enable one to switch at will between
graph, matrix and tree (hierarchical list) views of one's emerging evidence model. Such a tool
opens up new possibilities in the study of representational competencies, including coordinating
the use of multiple representations as well as choosing a single representation that best matches
the cognitive task at hand.
CHEMSENSE: DEVELOPING REPRESENTATIONAL FLUENCY IN CHEMISTRY
Elaine Coleman, SRI International
In chemistry, the use of representations is an inseparable part of the study of chemistry.
Representations, whether they are in the form of models, symbols, diagrams, or graphs, help to
tell a story or provide a framework to help students visualize the "world" of microscopic
particles.
For high school students studying chemistry, as compared to other sciences, this may be their
first organized encounter with a science that is, in many ways, very much removed from their
everyday experience.  Whereas biology and physics are often within the context of previous
student experience, much of chemistry is untouchable and unobservable and therefore relies on a
system of representations to explain chemical phenomenon (i.e., color change to represent that a
chemical reaction occurred).  Consequently we believe that students need to acquire a certain
representational fluency or literacy when it comes to understanding chemistry.
We have been developing a learning environment called ChemSense which enables students to
construct their own representations and animations or use a variety of ready made
representations as they work with chemistry probes during lab experiments.
Prior to our design and development we needed to find out how well chemistry students used
visual representations.  We conducted a series of interviews designed to prompt students to
explain chemical phenomena.  This was a “baseline study,” undertaken with the intent of
establishing how students incorporate traditional representations into their explanations and, by
extension, their understanding of chemistry (i.e., molecules and gases).  The goal was to be able
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to identify representational practices that would inform the design of tools for the ChemSense
learning environment.
Student pairs from a local high school were encouraged to "think aloud", to work together, and to
make use of tools for creating representations as they explained chemistry problems. These tools
were provided on the tables before them, specifically, paper and pens, molecular modeling kits,
and other items for creating three-dimensional molecules (i.e., toothpicks, marshmallows, round-
shaped candies.
We looked for evidence of students’ meta or representational competence (diSessa, 1999; Kozma
& Russell, 1997) in their discourse and manipulations of representations.  Specifically, we
wanted to find indications that students would do some of the following:
• See representations as corresponding in some way to ideas that explain phenomena.
• Identify and analyze features of a representation (such as a peak on a graph) and use them to
explain, draw inferences, and make predictions about chemical phenomena or concepts.
• Generate their own representations or select a different representation or a set of
representations for different purposes.
• Link chemical phenomena at the observable, physical level with an understanding of
chemistry at the particulate level.
• Move fluidly back and forth among chemical representations at both the macroscopic and
microscopic levels
• Evaluate representations and identify what they represent and fail to represent.
For the purposes of this paper, in the following sections we have identified examples of three of
the characteristics of representational competence in our interviews of students' reasoning with
chemical representations. We believe that this is the first step towards understanding how "meta"
representational competence can be identified and taught as well inform our design of the
ChemSense learning environment that we are developing.
Example 1:  Using representations as part of their justifications
Science making is the social, exploratory, negotiated process by which scientists construct the
tentative knowledge that is not widely accepted (Latour, 1987).   Given this view of science
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learning, we wanted to see if our students would refer to features of their representations as
backings, warrants and claims for their statements.  Regardless of whether their statements are
true, we believe that it is important for students to acquire a cognitive skill of thinking with the
use of the representations that are being constructed.
In the following example a student uses a 3d model of a molecule to justify why the angle of the
bonds do not change and then concludes that the molecule cannot have an alternative shape.
H:  They're all the same.
Experimenter:  They're all the same.
H:  They're all going to pull each other the same.
Experimenter:  Okay.
H:  Cause these all have the same electric, electromagnetivity. It doesn't matter
how much they push off each other. They're all the same so they're all going to
push off at the same angle. So they're all going to go be exactly the same angle if
you measure it.
Experimenter:  So you could rotate this…
H:  And it would stay exactly the same shape.
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In this example the students’ constructed model serves to provide a physical reality for the
underlying structure of the angles of the bonds.  In this way, the student uses the model as a
justification for his statement that “they (bond angles) stay exactly the same shape.”
In a second example a student uses his own previously constructed representations to explain
orbitals to another student.
H:  And we've got like the orbital -- it's a circular shape.
Experimenter:  All right.
H:  And there's going to be two (unintelligible)  exactly opposite sides… of each
other. And that's gonna be like the hydrogen… actually, there's only like, one
proton in there but that's okay! But, so that's what, all four of these hydrogens will
look like. While with C, the whole atom will look, you've got the C here, it will
look like (drawing) that inside. And then, it'll have its second P -- second S. I'm
getting mixed up. And it'll have two here, also along this side and it'll probably go
at exact angles to each other because it wants to get as far away.
"…it will look like that
inside."
Second S P Orbitals
Experimenter:  Okay.
H:  And then it has what's called P orbitals and they'll come out like this, like a
big 8. And they have… and they're kinda like this shape. They go kinda off…
one… they kinda go… tetrahydral shape.
Experimenter:  So you really need it -- it's hard to show on this?
H:  You can't. These are angles of a hun… six… what were the angles?
M:  (unintelligible)
H:  Like 180 or something between each one of them. And, when… so… you've
got a total of one, two from here, one, two from here. That's the second S orbital.
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And you've got four before you get to… to the P. So it's gonna be one, two, three,
four.
In both of these excerpts the representations help the students think through and explain their
justifications for their ideas.  They are learning to “talk chemically” by taking a position and
using the representations to support their ideas.  It is interesting to note that our preliminary
analyses of students’ representations and explanations showed that students were better able to
explain more complex ideas when they reasoned with the help of the representations as
compared to reasoning without them.  It is likely that aspects of the representations cue specific
types of knowledge.
Example 2: Focusing on particular aspects of the representations
We believe that being able to explain particular features of a representation is an example of
going beyond the surface level. In addition, comparing one feature of a representation to aspects
of another is further evidence that they can move fluidly between multiple representations and to
link them in meaningful ways.  In the first excerpt a student compares specific aspects of one
representation (bonds) with another representation instead of referring to each representation as a
whole.  In the second excerpt a student refers to the toothpicks of their model to explain what
they represent.
H:  (unintelligible)   when you use something like this, um, one S, two S, there we
go, one - two - three, one - two, and what hydrogen has is it has one like that.
Experimenter:  And that represents what?
H:  One electron. And this is your spin. If you have one -- one electron going at
one spin, going up, the other one automatically has to go down. So it's -- it wants
to go up. There's going to be a space here. And when it bonds with this one, it
does. So it gets down. Now if it was going to bond like this … bond here, this
one, there'd be a new one coming in that has a one S like this also. This one
doesn't have anywhere to go. So this one would have to jump up to the next level
so this one moves in. And that takes a lot of energy to jump up the levels.
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In the next excerpt a student explains that the toothpicks of 3d model represent the electrons and
not just the connections or bonds.
Experimenter:  Can you explain that?
R:  Okay. What this…
Experimenter:  Why don't you explain it since you made it?
R:  Yes, I'm sorry.
M:  This is like the… nucleus. (points to parts of the marshmallow model) This
represents the oxygen and these two are the hydrogens and he said there are two,
two, each, each toothpick represents two electrons… so… on this picture, there
are two electrons with the hydrogen and the oxygen between them so these are
two… they're two lone pairs… which kind of repel… the hydrogen… that's why it
looks like this.
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In the next example a student represents the idea of hydrogen bonding nicely and points out that
the difference between a solid and a liquid is due to the amount of hydrogen bonding.  Here the
student focuses on a particular aspect of the representation and moves between the 3d model and
their drawing.  It is important to note that the student suggests that there is no hydrogen bonding
in a liquid.  This is not correct.  In a liquid there is some hydrogen bonding, but not nearly as
much as in a solid.  Only a gas will not exhibit hydrogen bonding.
Experimenter:  A hydrogen bond. What’s a hydrogen bond?
G:  It’s like a… here’s a picture of one… it’s a bonding between two molecules
like right here… this is the hydrogen bond…
     
Experimenter:  So this end of the water molecule attaches to this end of the next
one.
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G:  Yeah. Cause this… see how they’re positive and negative…
Experimenter:  Okay.
G:  And these two are… and they attract together so they bond together.
Experimenter:  Okay so this fills a nice pattern and they’re all stuck together.
Okay, makes sense.
G:  And the other one for the liquid they’re not so attracted to each other so
they’re all kind of going everywhere, I guess. It’s just… they don’t have any
bonding together.
Example 3: Moving fluidly among different representations
It was also noted that students were able to link multiple representations and move fluidly back
and forth among them. We believe that these are important aspects of representational fluency
because students are recognizing that different representations serve different purposes and that
the same phenomena can be represented in multiple ways.
For example, in the following excerpt a student is explaining single and double bonds to their
partner and to the experimenter. In this case the student is prompted to move between a Lewis
Dot Structure and a 3d model of their molecule.
Experimenter:  Okay, so if I read this correctly I'd see four different bonds.
H:  Mmhmmh. Once it breaks off it goes through the fourth bond. While with
this, these we’re just combining the different spaces. They might -- it doesn't
really matter which one of the electrons combines.
Experimenter:  So comparing what you did here with what you have…
H:  Well this is the original with diatomic (unintelligible)  so you have four. It's
alone until it comes over. It's like six. And then you (laughing).
M:  You should let me go.
Experimenter:  And these are single in here? These are double?
H:  Ah, they are a -- they're a covalent bond but they're single.
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Experimenter:  Okay.
H:  The only time you see something like a double bond is like with um, oxygen
with what? Sulfuric acid?
M:  No.
H:  No. It's really hard to think of what it would be. I don't know, um, something
like this. That means double bond but these are single.
We present these three examples of representational fluency to promote the idea that students
need to become competent at using and manipulating representations if they are to be able to
move beyond the surface features of physical phenomena and rote manipulation of symbols.  We
believe that this kind of behavior is necessary for students to increase their knowledge of
chemistry as well as to advance their understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge (i.e.,
epistemic knowledge).  Gaining practice of representational use will help students see how
models can be used to test ideas or to understand that knowledge can be treated as an object of
inquiry and therefore become conjectural and not serve as a fact to be memorized.
We are currently developing a learning environment (ChemSense) to support the investigations
and uses of representations in laboratory settings.  We are building tools that promote
representational practices as students engage in investigations in their chemistry classrooms.
PIE: DESIGNING FOR EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE AROUND CONCEPTUAL
REPRESENTATIONS
Noel Enyedy, University of California, Berkeley
This section examines ways in which activities can be designed to prompt and support epistemic
discourse.  In particular, it looks at the potential for discussions in which students evaluate
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competing ways of reasoning about probability.  The potential value for these types of
discussions is illustrated by an example where the lack of consideration of conflicting
epistemologies may have influenced and in some cases hindered students' conceptual
development.
There are three well-defined ways of reasoning about probability and uncertainty.  First, there is
Subjective probability, which deals with the degree of belief or confidence in an uncertain
statement or event.   For example, one might say there is a greater probability that Los Angeles
will get a football expansion team than Monterey.  In this case one is expressing their respective
degree of confidence in a one-time event.  Second, there is Frequentist probability, which assigns
probabilities based on the long-term behavior of random events.  For example, one might
calculate the probability of rolling a seven on two dice by rolling the dice, recording the results,
and extrapolating from this empirical data.  Third, there is Classicist probability, which assigns
probabilities based on the quantification of all the equally likely possible outcomes that can
happen (i.e., the outcome space).  In this case the probability of rolling a seven on two dice is
calculated by enumerating the thirty-six possible equally likely outcomes for two dice and
counting the number of ways you can roll a seven (i.e., 6 out of 36).
Each of these ways of probabilistic reasoning has a long history and strikingly different
epistemological commitments.  Subjectivist probability considers knowledge itself to be
uncertain.  Frequentist probability grows out of the epistemological tradition of empiricism,
which argued that we don't really know things, but we only know about things.  From this
perspective perception plays a critical role in how we come to know things.  Knowledge is built
through induction and hypothesis testing.  Classicist probability, on the other hand, emerged
from the rationalist tradition, which argued that knowledge is a rediscovery of universal truths.
From this perspective, knowledge is constructed deductively from a priori truths and not one's
empirically verifiable perceptions.
There is evidence that students, particularly young students, intuitively reason about probability
from the Subjectivist perspective (Konold, 1989).  From this perspective students see each trial
of an experiment, not as one of many possible outcomes, but as the single outcome of the
experiment (Konold, 1989).
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However, from the perspective of some mathematicians as well as the mathematical standards
for K-12 mathematics education the subjectivist perspective is a misuse use of the mathematical
register because the term probability is restricted to refer to the long term trends and not single
events.  The national mathematical framework calls for students in the sixth through eighth grade
to both, "develop and evaluate inferences, prediction, and arguments that are based on data" and
also to "compute simple probabilities using appropriate methods, such as, lists, tree diagrams or
area models," (NCTM, 1998, pgs. 237-239).  That is, the NCTM framework calls for students to
be able to reason both from the Frequentist and Classicist point of view.
The Probability Inquiry Environment (PIE) was designed as a three week probability curriculum
for seventh grade students that marries these two perspectives. The PIE curriculum consists of a
number of computer-based and hands-on collaborative inquiry activities that are designed to help
students build from their existing understanding of probability.  In each PIE activity students
were asked to determine if a game of chance was “fair”.  PIE provided a simulation of each game
and a set of tools to help the students analyze the empirical data they generated.  From the
students' growing understanding of probability based on these long-term trends of their empirical
data (i.e., Frequentist probability), PIE builds towards a way of reasoning about probability
based on the more abstract concept of the outcome space (i.e., Classicist Probability).
In PIE both the Frequentist and Classicist ways of reasoning are anchored by representations.
Frequentist reasoning practices require representations of aggregated data such as bar charts,
fractions, and percentages.  This is necessary because it is difficult to perceive and reliably
reason about long term trends without quantifying and representing the data in some manner
first.  Classicist reasoning practices, on the other hand, require representations of the outcome
space such as ordered lists, tables, probability trees and area models.  Like empirical data, to
reason successfully from the outcome space it must first be represented.  PIE was successful in
helping students develop ways of reasoning around both types of conceptual representations.
But for some students there was an unanticipated resistance to move from Frequentist to
Classicist ways of reasoning that may be rooted not in their conceptual understanding but their
epistemological beliefs.
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Figure 5 shows two girls using their empirical data to inductively determine that the game they
are playing is fair.  In their talk they reference both that the number of points the two teams are
scoring is close and that the two teams are winning about the same number of games. Figure 6,
on the other hand, shows a student, in interaction with the teacher, coming to the same inference
about the same game deductively, based on the idea that both teams have the same number of
opportunities to score.
Figure 5:  Rosa and Maria reason from their data
Figure 6: Reasoning from the outcome space.
These two ways of reasoning are then juxtaposed in a whole class discussion.  In this debate
many students begin to adopt the classicist perspective of deducing fairness based on the
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quantification of the outcome space.  However, some students explicitly reject that it is a valid
way of reasoning saying, "I wouldn't really know if its fair, but I wouldn't know if it is unfair
either.  It would be hard to tell until I played it."  While by the end of the PIE curriculum most
students had appropriated the Classicist perspective, a minority of students still held that they
could not make predictions about future random events without first collecting empirical data
first.
It is possible to speculate from this example that some of the difficulty that students have in
successfully reasoning about probability is epistemological and not necessarily conceptual or
development, as has been assumed (Konold, 1989; Metz, 1995; Piaget & Inhelder, 1975).  If this
is true, then an essential part of the students' learning trajectories is to critically examine these
different reasoning practices. Comparing and evaluating these two reasoning practices, each
anchored by a different set of conceptual representations, would help bring the students' own
epistemologies to the forefront of the discussion.
Unfortunately, because we had not anticipated this particular difficulty we did not design
activities that juxtaposed the two perspectives to encourage and support the debate.  However, it
seems that a useful design principle can be learned from our experience in the classroom.  That
is, it is useful to consider different ways of representing (and labeling) distinct forms of
knowledge or reasoning practices so that they can be visually contrasted.  This comparison of
ways of reasoning and the types of conceptual representations that anchor these reasoning
practices would allow students to engage in a debate about the respective merits of each.   This in
turn would help the students to address their own epistemological perspective and how it is
related to different forms of mathematical reasoning.
OUTLOOK AND OPEN QUESTIONS
What do these various knowledge representations have in common and what are the epistemic
practices they appear to support?
The knowledge representations we have described are of two types.  ExplanationConstructor,
SenseMaker, and Belvedere are explicit epistemic representations.  They are each designed to
structure students' expression of their thinking in ways that focus on epistemological aspects of
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arguments.  Each is concerned with making knowledge claims explicit and publicly inspectable,
and in representing claims and evidence as distinct.  Their differences lie in the ways in which
they represent arguments, and potentially therefore in the way they communicate the nature of
scientific argumentation.  One useful line of research with respect to such epistemic
representations would examine how representational differences a) emphasize different
epistemic aspects of scientific knowledge; and b) lead to different kinds of interactions with the
representations and the consequences for epistemic practices.
The second type of representation, in PIE and ChemSense, includes discipline-specific
conceptual representations.  The epistemological aspects, or values if you will, are often implicit
in such representations.  The examples in each section of students using these representations to
make arguments show that they can support valued epistemic practices, and illustrate how
epistemological ideas are tightly interwoven with conceptual notions.  An interesting line of
research of these kinds of representations could be to consider how they might communicate
epistemological ideas more explicitly.
We are not alone, of course, in our interest to design knowledge representations to support
epistemic practices (Hawkins & Pea, 1987; Jackson et al., 1994; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1993).
We want to argue, however, that the goals and practices described here go beyond typical
discussions of scientific reasoning to explicitly address how students' epistemologies of science
can be developed, in addition to their understanding of science concepts and their ability to
inquire into novel problems.  To date, there has been scant research to try to link students'
inquiry experiences in science to their epistemologies of science.  One of us has found that
students' ideas about the nature of theories, experiments, and their relations do not change after
an inquiry-based unit (Sandoval & Morrison, 2000), while others have found that such changes
occur only through targeted instruction (Carey et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1999).  Finally, as we
have suggested above, many of the efforts here have led to productive learning, both about
specific science concepts and about processes of argumentation.  More research is needed,
however, to understand how particular representations support particular epistemic practices.
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